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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMBINED METALS REDUC-
TION COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Resp,ondent, 
vs. 
TOOELE COUNTY, a Body Corpor-
ate and Politic of the State of 
Utah, and PHARES HAYNES as 
'rreasurer of TOOELE COUNTY, 
UTAH, 
Defendants and AppeUants. 
Case 
No. 6907 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent's position is that there is no question of 
fact in dispute in this case. However, should appellants 
point out any essential fact alleged by respondent and 
denied by appellant, and necessary to the determination 
of the question herejn involved, respondent will concede 
thlt the judgment should be reversed and the case sent 
1 
back for determination of such fact. 
With changes in the figures and slight modification 
otherwise, we therefore paraphrase and adopt the state-
ment of facts on which the Montana court in the case of 
Klies v Linnane ( 156 p. 2d 183, Feb. 26, 1945) based its 
decision: 
During the year 1943 plaintiff (respondent) pro-
duced ore containing specified amounts of gold, silver, 
copper, lead and zinc which it sold on the open market 
to purchasers other than the United States Government 
for $390,679.96; in addition to that ~amount so received 
by it from the sale of said metals the Government of the 
United States, acting through the Metals Reserve Corp-
oration (company), paid to respondent as a premium or 
bonus for the copper, lead and zinc so produced by it the 
sum of $272,150.86 for the purpose of encouraging the 
production of said metals over and above established 
quotas; respondent was entitled to deduct certain costs 
for expense totaling $501,888.44. 
Based upon such statement of facts, the court then 
states the question for consideration: 
If the premium or bonus received from the Govern-
ment was not properly included as part of the gross value 
of the metals for the purpose of computing the net pro-
ceeds tax thereon, the deductions exceeded the value and 
no tax was payable; but if the premium or bonus was 
properly included for that purpose, a tax of $2,832.59 
(our figure) was due and payable, in which event the 
judgment herein for the recovery of the payment should 
be reversed. 
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Appellant's brief poses the same question as that 
shortly stated by the Supreme Court of Montana. See 
statement of facts, assignment of error, and points re-
lied upon, pp. 1-8. Proceeding with its argument it 
quotes the provisions of our constitution, and we need 
not repeat them, pp. 8-10. It then takes up our statutory 
pr-ovisions and quotes Sec. 80-5-3 U. C.A. 1943 (which 
our Legislature failed to amend by changing the word 
three to two), and Section 80-5-57 defining ''net annual 
proceeds,'' italicizing • • gross pr-oceeds realized during 
the preceding calendar year from the sale or conversion 
into money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine or 
mining claim cxtra.cted" and devotes the rest of the brief 
to an effort to show that these words do not mean what 
they say. It cites (p. 12) the case of Salt Lake County 
v Utah Copper Company, 93 Fed. 2d 127, which obviously 
did not deal with the question in the case at bar, but does 
have in it something of value for the determination of 
this case, and they quote it, "All words of a law must 
have effect, rather than that part should perish by con-
struction." It also at p. 13 attempts to differentiate the 
yard stick set in the Occupation Tax statute from that 
used in the Net Proceeds Tax statute. At p. 15 it calls 
attention to two criminal cases in which it was held that 
ceiling prices did not fix value for such purpose but that 
opinion evidence was admissable to determine the degree 
of crime. At p. 16 it calls attention to the early case of 
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v Spry, 16 Utah 222, 
52 Pac. 382, and says the doctrine has never been de-
parted from (with which we agree) but overlooks the 
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earlier case of State v Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 615, 
which lays down the rule (syl. 1)-
"Under Sections 2 and 3, Art. 13, Const., all 
taxable property within this state must be assess-
ed and taxed on a valuation fixed at its actual 
cash value, or as near such value as is reasonably 
practicable. The test of such value is the cash 
price for which the property valued would sell 
in open market.'' 
Then follows citation and comments on some cases 
involving "gross," "gross income''' and "gross pre-
miums,'' but since respondent admits the receipt of sub-
sidy payments constituted part of its gross income, WE' 
see no point in these. 
Turning then to the bottom of page 18, appellants 
say respondent will (and respondent does) admit that the 
Federal Government through Metals Reserve Company 
paid the premium prices to the producers in order to 
obtain increased production of the ores involved, which 
increased production the Government needed to prose-
cute the war. And that "The Government through the 
metals prices, paid only for what it got." Following 
that part of the argument further, we are inclined to 
admit that during the year 1943, the Government saved 
$147,663,900.00; that is to say, the producers got thai 
much less for their production than they would have re-
ceived except for the Government program. 
Then we find some more income tax cases, pp. 21-
23, and come to appellant's effort (pp. 24-25) to distin-
guish Klies v Linnane, 156 P. 2d 183, from the case at 
bar. At page 27 appellants suggest that respondent 
4 
should consent to the elimination of "these added costs 
of producing the ore from their claimed expense deduc-
tion.'' 
Throughout there are interspersed appellant's arg-
uments and comments, all, as it seems to us, built upon 
faulty premises. 
I. 
WERE THE PREMIUM OR BONUS (SUB-
SIDY) PAYMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE GOV-
ERNMENT PROPERLY INCLUDED AS PART 
OF THE GROSS VALUE OF THE METALS FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF COMPUTING THE NET 
PROCEEDS THEREON? 
Appellant's whole theory appears to rest upon two 
propositions-
!. That Klies v. Linnane is not an authority for 
the reason that, as they seem to think, there is 
a distinction between the Montana and the Utah 
statutes; 
2. That due to the war and the measures taken by 
the United States Government for our national 
saefty, there was not a free and open, but a 
controlled, market; therefore, although the Utah 
statutory measuring stick is obviously based on 
bona fide sales of ore production, sales of ore 
made by the producers were not sales, but some 
indefinite and ind(~finable something else. 
\Ve think their argument ingenious, but unsound. 
The question is one of first impression in this juris-
diction. Decisions contrary to appellant's position have 
been reached by the United States District Court for the 
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District of Utah under the Occupation Tax statute and 
under the Net Proceeds Tax statute (cases pending on 
appeals); by two of our own district court judges-Judge 
Bronson in the Occupation Tax case now pending in this 
court, and Judge Henderson, in this case, and by the 
Montana Supreme Court in the Klies v. Linnane case. 
It is not claimed that any such decision is binding on this 
court; we do urge they should be persuasive. 
Appellants s,ay that the Montana case is not sup-
ported by any authority; certainly appellants have cited 
no authority that condemns it. An effort is made to dis-
tinguish it on the ground that our statute is not the same 
as the Montana statute. The statutes are not the same, 
but the difference does not make for the distinction 
appellants claim. 
Appellants' comment on Sec. 2090.4 of the Montana 
Code (p. 24 of its brief) is, inadvertently misleading. 
We quote the section in full as follows: 
"2090.4 FALSE OR FRAUDULBNT REPORTR, 
PROCEDURE IN CASE OF. 
If any such report required by this chapter contains 
any wilfully false or fraudulent statements as to the 
gross amount received by any person, corporation or 
association so engaged in mining as aforesaid, for any 
mine's product, then the said state board of equaliza-
tion shall compute the gross value of such mine's prod-
uct, and such gross value shall be based upon the average 
quotations of the price of such mine's product in New 
York City, or the relative market value at the point of 
delivery, as evidenced by some established authority or 
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market report, such as the Engineering and Mining 
.T ournal of New York City, or some other standard pub-
lication, giving the market reports for the year covered 
by the statement; and, provided further, that if any such 
person, corporation, or association has sold or otherwise 
disposed of any of its mine's product at a price sub-
stantially below the true market price of such product at 
the time and place of such sale or disposal, then the 
state board of equalization shall compute the gross value 
of such portion of said Mine's product, so sold or dis-
posed of substantially below the market price as afore-
said, which gross value shall be based upon the quotations 
of the price of such mine's product in New York City, 
or the relative market value at the point of delivery at 
the time such portion of the product was so sold or other-
wise disposed of, as evidenced by some established au-
thority or market report, such as the Engineering and 
Mining Journal, of New York City, or some other stand-
ard publication giving the market reports for the year 
covered by such statement. Should there be no quotation 
covering any particular product, then the state board 
of equalization shall fix the value of such gross product, 
or such portion thereof, as shall have been sold or other-
wise disposed of at a priee substantially below the true 
mark~t price at the time and place of such sale or dis-
posal in sueh mann PI' aR may seem to he equitable." 
In the case of State ex rel Snidow et al. v State 
Board of Equalization, ct al, 93 Mont. 19, 25, 17 P. 2d 68, 
77, the Court had hefore it the Montana Occupation or 
License Tax statutes. Comparison of Sec. 2090.4 herein-
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above quoted, with Sec 3 of the License Tax Act, as 
quoted by the Court in that case at page 71 of 17 P. 2d, 
shows that for the ascertainment of ''gross value of 
product'' exactly the same yard stick is used as in the 
Net Proceeds statute, and in our opinion the same thing 
is true in this state. In general the case holds that the 
market value of the ores is to be ascertained. not by taking 
the pounds and ounces of metals produced and multi-
plying the same by the New York prices for metals for 
the preceding year, but that the market value in Montana 
is to he found by taking the New York quotations and 
allowing certain differentials or deductions; in other 
words, that the words "based upon" in the statute means 
that differentials must be permitted in order to find the 
market value in Montana. And the Court also held that 
the Board of Equalization had been in error in permitting 
the use of East St. Louis quotation of market prices for 
zinc to ascertain the market price in Montana, and this 
for the reason that the statute clearly provided for the 
use of New York quotations. We are unable to under-
stand why appellants cite this case unless it is for the 
purpose of proving that Montana followed the correct 
rule of statutory construction and held that their statute 
meant what it said. So far as we• kn(rw no Mo-,Jtana case 
has departed from that rule. 
We make no contention that the statutes of Montana 
and those of Utah are exactly alike. The Montana statute, 
as appellants point out, requires ascertainment of the 
market value (in Montana) based upon the average quo-
tations of the price of such mine's product in New York 
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City; the Utah statute says nothing about quotations at 
New York City, or any other place. However, as a matter 
of fact, and this is common knowledge in the industry, ore 
sales in Utah are based upon New York quotations for all 
metals except zinc which is subject to quotations at East 
St. Louis, all as quoted in the Engineering and Mining 
.Journal. There is no substantial difference in the result 
attained under either statute. 
Appellants' brief does not clearly state what distinc-
tion is claimed; certainly it does not advance any reason 
why this court should not do the same thing as the Mon-
tana court did and adhere to the plain meaning and intent 
of the law as enacted by the legislature. 
Our statute provides: 
Sec. 80-5-57, U. C. A. 1943-The words, "net annual 
proceeds,'' of a metalliferous mine or mining claim are 
defined to be the gross proceeds realized during the pre-
ceding calendar year from the sale or conversion into 
money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine or 
mining claim extracted by the owner or lessee, con-
tractor or other person working upon or operating the 
property, including ,all dumps and tailings, during or 
previous to the year for which the assessment is made, 
less the following, and no other, deductions: • • • '' 
If there be eliminated from the above words "or 
conversion into money or its equivalent,'' it could hardly 
be contended that a bona fide sale of ore by a producer 
to a mill or smelt~r did not meet the exact terms of the 
statute. Does the inclusion of those words permit of a 
construction that what was meant was that two or more 
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standards were fixed: Or does it mean that conversion 
into money or its equivalent must meet the same standard 
as would be reached by a sale. If the former is true, 
then the statute would be unconstitutional as lacking uni-
formity, and if the latter, it would not be. Moreover, 
different operators were assigned different quotas upon 
which payment of subsidies was based, and the subsidies 
themselves varied, being A, or A and B, or A, B and C, 
as the Quota Committee might determine. The result of 
including the subsidy payments in net proceeds for the 
tax base would be we would have no standard at all-all 
of which is pointed out in Klies v. Linnane. 
We think the Five Per Cent cases decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, March 3, 1884 (110 
U.S. 471, 28 L. Ed. 198), announce principles which can 
be safely followed in answering the question here in-
volved. Congress had enter,ed into compacts with each 
of some nineteen western and southern states whereby 
five per cent of the net proceeds of public lands lying 
within the states respectively, and afterwards sold by 
Congress, should be reserved and appropriated for the 
benefit of the respective states. The question there was 
whether lands disposed of by the United States in satis-
faction of military grants were lands sold within the 
meaning of the compacts, and the court held they were 
not. We quote : 
''A sale, in the ordinary sense of the word, 
is a transfer of property for a fixed price in 
money or its equivalent. \Vhen property or money 
is transferred or paid as a compensation for 
service, the property or money may be said to be 
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the price of the service; but it can hardly be said 
that the service is the price of the property or 
money, or that the property or money is sold to 
the person performing the service. Nor can it 
be said that the pay of an officer or soldier in 
the army or navy is sold to him by the govern-
ment in consideration of a price paid by him. 
"Land or money, other than current s·alary 
or pay, granted by the government to a person 
entering the military or naval service of the coun-
try, has always been called a bounty; and, while 
it is by no means a gratuity, because the promise 
to grant it is one of the considerations for which 
the soldier or sailor enters the service, yet it is 
clearly distinguishable from salary or pay meas-
ured by the time of service. For example, it was 
held by Lord Mansfield and the Court of King's 
Bench in 1784, that though the master of an ap-
prentice was entitled by the act of Parliament of 
2 & 3 Anne, ch. 6, s. 17, to the wages of his ap-
prentice enlisting into the navy, yet the appren-
tice's share of prize money belonged to himself, 
and not to his master, because it was not wages, 
but the bounty of the crown. Garson v. Watts, 3 
Doug. 350; Eades v. Candeput, 4 Doug. 1. Upon 
like grounds, it has been held that bounty money 
paid by the United States, or by a state, city or 
town, upon the enlistment of a minor as a soldier, 
during the recent war, belonged to him, and not 
to his father or master. Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen, 
497; Kelly v. Sprout, 97 Mass. 169. See also 
Alexander v. \VPllington, 2 Russ & Myl. 35, 56, 64. 
• • • • 
''The question before us is not whether the 
promise by the government of a bounty in land 
or n:oney to persons entering the military service 
is a contract for valuable consideration; but 
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whether, when carried into effect, it constitutes 
a sale by the government; and it is quite clear 
that land granted by way of reward for military 
services has never been treated, in the legislation 
of the United States upon the subject, as sold, but 
has always been considered as analogous to money 
paid in a gross sum by way of bounty. 
• • • • 
''From the very beginning of our existencr 
as a nation, the reward of military service has 
been treated as a national object and a public use, 
to which the national domain might justly and 
lawfully be applied. As new states have been suc-
cessively formed out of the territory of the United 
States, and admitted into the Union, the acts of 
admission have reserved, for the making of public 
highways and other public uses of the State, a 
twentieth part of the net proceeds of public lands 
lying within the State, and afterwards sold by the 
United States. But public lands taken upon mili-
tary land warrants issued under general laws, 
passed for the national object of encouraging and 
rewarding military service, and not limited to any 
particular State, have no more been regarded as 
lands sold, for any portion of the value of which 
the national government should account to the 
State in which the lands are actually taken up, 
than lands reserved and used for forts, arsenals 
or lighthouses.'' 
In the case of Luke v East Vulture Mining Company 
(Arizona, March 2, 1936), 54 P. 2d 1002, the court con-
strued the Arizona privilege tax ( Ch. 77, Laws of 1935) 
of 1 per centum upon the gross proceeds of sales or gross 
income from the business of mining, etc. Section 7, arti-
cle 2 of said chapter exempted from the tax ''any sales 
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made to the United States Government." Notwithstand-
ing this express exemption the Tax Commission laid the 
tax on the mining company in relation to dispositions of 
gold and silv-er to the United States, claiming that be-
cause such disposition was required by Federal law and 
was thus a ''forced sale'' the exemption was not allow-
able. The situation was somewhat the reverse of our 
situation. The court said (p. 1003 column Pac. Rep.}-
"We conclude that, even though the disposi-
tion of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates 
by the owner can be made to the United States 
only, and upon terms and conditions fixed by the 
United States, such a transaction, when acquiesced 
in by the owner, is a sale within the meaning of 
said section 7, supra. The fact that it is a forced 
sale does not make it any the less a sale." (Our 
emphasis.) 
Appellants argue also that the statutory definition 
·of net proceeds includes income from any and all sources, 
and they devote a great de·al of space in their bri·ef to 
income tax cases and to prove that subsidies, bonuses 
and gifts are a part of gross income under income tax 
statutes. (Brief 16-17, 21-23). They cite such cases as 
State v Illinois Central R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814, 
where the words "g-ross receipts" used in a statute im-
posing a tax of 7'1o on ''gross receipts'' were defined as 
the "·entire amount, the total ·sum, without deduction of 
any kind." They quote Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 
v Roulliard, ________________________________ N. H, ________________________________ , 24 
Atl. 2d 264, where under a statute imposing a tax of 2% 
upon ''gross premiums received,'' the word ''gross'' was 
]3 
defined to mean the "whole; entire, total without deduc-
tion.'' They refer to other cases construing such words 
as "gross earnings" and "income." (Brief 14-15.) 
We think such arguments and references contribute 
nothing to a solution of our problem. Our legislature 
could have used such phrases a·s ''income,'' ''gross earn-
ings, " "gross receipts" or "gross premi urns, " or words 
of similar import, but it chose not to do so and limited the 
definition of ''Net proceeds'' to the words, wi·th the re-
strictions and subject to the deductions contained in the 
Utah Statutes. 
There is no mystery as to the character or purpose 
of subsidy, premium, bounty or bonus payments; such 
payments have long been made under various conditions. 
In 8 Am. J ur. 824, it is said: 
>"" 
j "Bounties are usually offered by some gov-
/ ernment unit, and necessarily for a public pur-
: pose. In this limited sense, then, a bounty is 
ordinarily money offered by a government, to any 
member of the public who will in the future render 
a specified service to the public, either by the 
performance of acts, or by the investment of time 
and money in a project benefiting the public. * * * 
Within this definition, bounties are not pure 
gratuities, inasmuch as their payment, while 
neither salary nor wages for the work performed 
or obligations assumed, is one of the considera-
tions for such performance or assumption." 
In passing we note appellants' apparent desire that 
the words ''gross proceeds realized'' be kept in mind and 
that the significant modifying phrase ''from the sale or 
conversiOn into money or its equivalent" be forgotten; 
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although the authorities they cite are all to the effect that 
all the words of a statute must be taken into considera-
tion in construing it, and yet they say (p. 33), "The ex-
clusion of the premium payments from the computation 
of net proceeds would effectuate a great wrong and would 
do violence to the normal, natural meaning of the words 
of the statute." 
'V e think the function of this court is to construe 
the statute as written, and that if so construed it effec-
tuates a great wrong, the remedy lies with the legis-
lature, and in this connection we remark that we have had 
two regular and some special sessions of our lawmakers 
since this question became current and they have done 
nothing about it. And it is at least a novel idea that it is 
neccessary to leave out part of the words of a statute 
in order not to do violence to the normal, natural meaning 
of the words. 
As to ''free and open markets,'' not alone metal 
markets felt the impact of the Federal laws and regula-
tions; it need hardly be suggested that our whole eoo-
nomic structure was affected. Logically, it seems to us, 
the Tax Commission might just as well try to collect 
sales tax from us on the basis of what the market might 
have been, or that landlords pay income tax on the basis 
of what rentals they might have collected, except for the 
regulations, as to try and include the premium metal pay-
ments. Here again we have a question of economics which 
is for the legislature and not the court to deal with. 
15 
II. 
Paragraph 15 of respondent's complaint is as fol-
lows: 
15. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the 
United States empowers Congress to declare and 
prosecute war, and Section 10 of the same article 
denies such power to the states, and the laying and 
collection by defendants of the tax on the subsidy 
payments made by authority of Congress to plaintiff 
was and is a substantial interference with the func-
tions of the national government in the exercise of 
such powers ; and the laying and collection of such 
tax was and is wholly without authority under the 
constitution and laws of the State of Utah, or other-
wise, or at all, and is an arbitrary usurpation of 
power and a taking of plaintiff's property without 
due process of law in violation of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amednment to the Constitution of the 
United States and of Section 7 of Article l of the 
Constitution of the St,ate of Utah. 
This paragraph raises a number of constitutional 
questions both Federal and State and appellants devote 
pages 33-37 of their brief to a discussion of these ques-
tions as they apprehend them. \V e do not agree that 
they have discussed all of the questions or that the au-
thorities they have cited are in point. We think the 
principal question rajsed by our allegation is whether 
in the cirmcumst,ances here it may be said that the effort 
to tax premium payments results in an interference with 
the power of Congress to declare and prosecute war. 
The writer has been unable to find any case in point on 
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that question. However, we do not desire to wari.ve the 
constitutional questions involved by not arguing them 
here more at length. 
In our opinion the judgment of the lower court was 
right and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HERBERT VAN DAM, 
Attorney_ for Respondent 
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